Congress Just Opened a Fault Line Beneath the Constitution with Its Most Dangerous Religious Test Yet
In Washington, lawmakers argue over borders every year. They fight about walls, visas, asylum caps, surveillance, and deportation quotas with a familiar ferocity that now feels built into the machinery of American politics. But the latest proposal tied to immigration has detonated something far deeper than policy—it has ignited a direct collision with the Constitution itself. Representative Chip Roy’s proposed “Preserving a Sharia-Free America Act” is not merely another ideological provocation. It is a legal challenge to the very idea that the United States is a nation where government cannot discriminate based on religion.
At the heart of the bill is a radical premise: that adherence to, advocacy for, or perceived alignment with Sharia law can be used as grounds for exclusion, denial of entry, or even removal from the United States. On its face, proponents frame the measure as a national security safeguard. In its structure and implications, however, it functions as something far more sweeping—a religious test for entry into the country, dressed in the language of counterterrorism.
The U.S. Constitution is unambiguous on this point. Religious tests for public trust are explicitly forbidden. The First Amendment erects a firewall between the state and religious doctrine. The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process. The Equal Protection doctrine forbids discrimination based solely on religious identity. Yet this bill attempts to thread a needle through all of those protections by reframing the issue not as religion, but as ideology. Supporters argue that Sharia is not merely a religious system, but a legal-political framework incompatible with American constitutional order.

That distinction, legal scholars warn, collapses under scrutiny. Sharia is not a single code, nor a monolithic political system. It is a broad moral and legal tradition interpreted in radically different ways across cultures, nations, and individual belief systems. For hundreds of millions of Muslims worldwide, Sharia governs personal ethics—how to pray, how to fast, how to give charity—not governance, criminal law, or political authority. Attempting to criminalize or exclude belief in Sharia is functionally identical to excluding religion itself.
If enacted, such a law would represent the first time Congress explicitly codified a religious doctrine as incompatible with legal presence in the United States. Legal experts immediately compared the bill to historical moments America has since repudiated: the Chinese Exclusion Act, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, and more recently the travel bans that targeted predominantly Muslim nations. Each of those actions was defended at the time as necessary for national security. Each is now widely recognized as rooted in fear, racialization, and religious prejudice rather than demonstrable threat.
What makes the Roy proposal uniquely destabilizing is that it reframes immigration enforcement as an instrument of religious regulation. Enforcement mechanisms under the bill would require federal agencies to determine not only what someone has done, but what they believe. That alone is constitutionally radioactive. Courts have consistently held that government cannot probe theology to determine legal status. Yet this bill would force officers, judges, and immigration tribunals into exactly that territory.
Supporters counter that the bill targets advocacy for imposing Sharia as governing law, not private belief. But critics note that the language is far broader and dangerously vague. How does one distinguish between religious practice and political promotion in speech, text, or personal conduct? Would a Muslim lawyer referencing family law traditions abroad be flagged? Would a student discussing comparative religious systems fall under scrutiny? Would charitable giving to organizations with Islamic roots be treated as ideological alignment?
The ambiguity is not a flaw—it is the weapon. Vague language grants maximum discretion to enforcement agencies, the same structural mechanism that allowed earlier travel bans to operate with wide latitude and minimal accountability. Once belief becomes evidence, safeguards evaporate.
Beyond constitutional law, the political ramifications are explosive. The bill lands at a moment when immigration politics are already running at maximum voltage. Border encounters are up. Asylum systems are overwhelmed. Election-year messaging is hardening. In that environment, invoking Sharia is not accidental—it taps into two decades of post-9/11 fear architecture that has never fully dissolved. The bill does not merely propose enforcement. It constructs a moral enemy.

That is why civil rights organizations describe the measure not merely as unconstitutional, but as an attempt to legally redefine national identity along religious lines. In that formulation, Americanness becomes implicitly Christian-coded, while Islam is framed as inherently foreign, incompatible, and suspect. That framing is not new—but enshrining it in statute would be unprecedented in modern U.S. history.
Even many conservative legal scholars have expressed alarm. Originalist readings of the Constitution leave little room for religious exclusion. The Framers, acutely aware of the dangers of sectarian rule, built explicit barriers against religious tests precisely because European history had shown what happens when states adopt official theologies. The Roy bill effectively attempts to smuggle one in through immigration law.
International consequences would also be profound. The United States has long positioned itself—however imperfectly—as a defender of religious liberty abroad. Enacting a law that singles out a specific faith for exclusion would instantly compromise that standing. It would invite retaliatory measures against religious minorities abroad, weaken human rights advocacy, and fracture already strained diplomatic relationships with Muslim-majority nations that cooperate with U.S. security efforts.

The legal battle that would erupt if the bill advanced would be immediate and brutal. Federal courts would almost certainly issue injunctions. Civil liberties groups would file constitutional challenges within hours. Appeals would race toward the Supreme Court. And for the first time in generations, the Court would be forced to confront a case that asks whether religious exclusion can be repackaged as ideological screening.
That question cuts straight into the marrow of American law. If Congress can exclude one religious tradition by declaring its doctrines politically dangerous, what stops future lawmakers from doing the same to others? Could conservative Christians be excluded under a future Congress for opposing abortion law? Could Orthodox Jews be barred for following religious courts in family disputes? Could Catholics be targeted over canon law? Once belief itself becomes a legal threat, all faiths become provisional.
For immigrants and U.S. citizens alike, the psychological impact is already rippling outward. Muslim communities report surges in fear, not only about border policy but about citizenship security itself. The suggestion that religious belief could trigger scrutiny resurrects memories of post-9/11 surveillance, secret watchlists, and loyalty profiling. Even naturalized citizens wonder, quietly, what line might one day be drawn backward.
Politically, the bill functions as a loyalty signal more than a viable statute. Its introduction creates a clear dividing line: those who frame immigration exclusively as a security threat versus those who insist that the Constitution remains the governing authority even in moments of fear. It also allows its sponsors to shift debate away from policy failures at the border toward cultural identity warfare, where evidence matters less than emotion.
But the reason legal scholars describe this moment as a constitutional crisis is not because the bill will certainly pass. It is because the bill tests whether the Constitution still acts as a fixed boundary—or merely an obstacle to be challenged until it bends. Each time exclusion is justified with new language, the line moves. Today it is Sharia. Tomorrow it could be something else.
America has faced this test before in different forms. Each time, the nation has eventually had to admit that fear-driven lawmaking corrodes the very freedoms it claims to protect. Whether that recognition arrives before or after another generation of litigation, trauma, and rollback remains an open question.
What is no longer open is this: the debate has crossed from ordinary immigration policy into the territory where the identity of the republic itself is up for argument. Not who may enter, but who the law is allowed to become.
And once that question is opened, the answer will not be confined to the border.
